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Stable partitions in coalitional games
Krzysztof R. Apt∗ Tadeusz Radzik†
Abstract
We propose a notion of a stable partition in a coalitional game that is
parametrized by the concept of a defection function. This function assigns
to each partition of the grand coalition a set of different coalition arrange-
ments for a group of defecting players. The alternatives are compared
using their social welfare.
We characterize the stability of a partition for a number of most natu-
ral defection functions and investigate whether and how so defined stable
partitions can be reached from any initial partition by means of simple
transformations.
The approach is illustrated by analyzing an example in which a set of
stores seeks an optimal transportation arrangement.
1 Introduction
The problem of coalition formation has become an important research direction
in theoretical economics, notably game theory. It has been studied from many
points of view beginning with [1], where the static situation of coalitional games
in the presence of a given coalition structure (i.e., a partition) was considered
and where the issue of coalition formation was briefly alluded to (on pages 233–
234). The early research on the subject was discussed in [8].
More recently, the problem of formation of stable coalition structures was
considered in [13] in the presence of externalities and in [11] in the presence
of binding agreements. In both papers two-stage games are analyzed. In the
first stage coalitions form and in the second stage the players engage in a non-
cooperative game given the emerged coalition structure. In this context the
question of stability of the coalition structure is then analyzed.
Much research on stable coalition structures focussed on hedonic games.
These are games in which the payoff of a player depends exclusively on the
members of the coalition he belongs to. In other words, a payoff of a player is
a preference relation on the sets of players that include him. [4] considered four
forms of stability in such games: core, Nash, individual stability and contrac-
tually individual stability. Each alternative captures the idea that no player,
respectively, no group of playes has an incentive to change the existing coalition
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structure. The problem of existence of (core, Nash, individually and contractu-
ally individually) stable coalitions was considered in this and other references,
for example [12] and [5]. A potentially infinitely long coalition formation process
in the context of hedonic games was studied in [2]. This leads to another notion
of stability analogous to subgame perfect equilibrium.
Recently, [3] compared various notions of stability and equilibria in network
formation games. These are games in which the players may be involved in a
network relationship that, as a graph, may evolve. Other interaction structures
which players can form were considered in [7], in which formation of hierarchies
was studied, and [10] in which only bilateral agreements that follow a specific
protocol were allowed.
Finally, the computer science perspective is illustrated by [6] in which an
approach to coalition formation based on Bayesian reinforcement was considered
and tested empirically.
In this paper we propose to study the existence and formation of stable coali-
tion structures in the setting of coalitional games, by proposing and studying
a concept that bears some similarity with the Nash equilibrium. We consider
partitions of the grand coalition and view a partition stable if no group of play-
ers has a viable alternative to staying within the partition. The alternatives are
provided as a set of different coalition arrangements for the group of defecting
players and are compared using their social welfare.
The following example hopefully clarifies our approach. We shall return to
it in the last section.
Example 1.1 Consider a set of stores located in a number of cities. Each store
belongs to a chain. Suppose that each chain has a contract with a transportation
company to deliver goods to all the stores belonging to the chain.
We can now envisage a situation in which a group of stores decides to leave
this transportation arrangement and choose another one, for example the one
in which the stores from the same city have a contract with one transportation
company.
So from the viewpoint of the transportation logistics the stores from the
‘defecting’ group of stores are now partitioned not according to the chains they
belong to but according to the cities they are located at. Such an alterna-
tive transportation arrangement is then a different, preferred, partition for the
defecting group of stores. From our viewpoint the original transportation ar-
rangement was then unstable. ✷
These alternatives to the existing partition of the grand coalition are for-
malized by means of a defection function that assigns to each partition a set
of partitioned subsets of the grand coalition. By considering different defection
functions we obtain different notions of stability. Two most natural defection
functions are the one that allows formation of all partitions of all subsets and
the one that allows formation of all partitions of the grand coalition.
We characterize these notions of stability and in the second part of the
paper analyze the problem of whether and how so defined stable partitions can
be reached from any initial partition by means of ‘local’ transformations.
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2 Preliminary definitions
We begin by introducing the basic concepts. Let N = {1, 2, . . . , n} be a fixed
set of players called the grand coalition and let (v,N) be a coalitional TU-game
(in short a game). That is, v is a function from the powerset of N to R. In
what follows we assume that v(∅) = 0. We call the elements of N players and
non-empty subsets of N coalitions.
A game (v,N) is called
• additive if v(A) + v(B) = v(A ∪B),
• superadditive if v(A) + v(B) ≤ v(A ∪B)
• strictly superadditive if v(A) + v(B) < v(A ∪B),
where in each case the condition holds for every two disjoint coalitions A and
B of N .
A collection (in the grand coalition N) is any family C := {C1, . . . , Cl}
of mutually disjoint coalitions of N , and l is called its size. If additionally⋃l
j=1 Cj = N , the collection C is called a partition of N .
Given a collection C := {C1, . . . , Cl} and a partition P := {P1, . . . , Pk} we
define
C[P ] := {P1 ∩ (∪
l
j=1Cj), . . . , Pk ∩ (∪
l
j=1Cj)} \ {∅}
and call C[P ] the collection C in the frame of P . (By removing the empty set
we ensure that C[P ] is a collection.) To clarify this concept consider Figure 1.
We depict in it a collection C, a partition P and C in the frame of P (together
with P ). Here C consists of three coalitions, while C in the frame of P consists
of five coalitions.
Intuitively, given a subset S of N and a partition C := {C1, . . . , Cl} of S, the
collection C offers the players from S the ‘benefits’ resulting from the partition
of S by C. However, if a partition P of N is ‘in force’, then the players from
S enjoy instead the benefits resulting from the partition of S by C[P ], i.e., by
C in the frame of P . Finally, note that if C is a partition of N , then C[P ] is
simply P .
For a collection C := {C1, . . . , Cl} we define now
sw(C) :=
l∑
j=1
v(Cj)
and call sw(C) the social welfare of C. So for a partition P := {P1, . . . , Pk}
sw(C[P ]) =
k∑
i=1
v(Pi ∩ (∪
l
j=1Cj)).
We call sw(C[P ]) the P -modified social welfare of the collection C. That is, the
P -modified social welfare of C is the social welfare of C in the frame of P .
3
C in the frame of P
Collection C
Partition P
Figure 1: A collection C in the frame of a partition P
Given a partition P := {P1, . . . , Pk} we call a coalition T of N P -compatible
if for some i ∈ {1, . . . , k} we have T ⊆ Pi and P -incompatible otherwise. Further,
we call a partition Q := {Q1, . . . , Ql} P -homogeneous if for each j ∈ {1, . . . , l}
some i ∈ {1, . . . , k} exists such that either Qj ⊆ Pi or Pi ⊆ Qj . Equivalently,
a partition Q is P -homogeneous if each Qj is either P -compatible or equals
∪i∈TPi for some T ⊆ {1, . . . , k}. So any P -homogeneous partition arises from
P by allowing each coalition either to split into smaller coalitions or to merge
with other coalitions.
The crucial notion in our considerations is that of a defection function. It is
a function D which associates with each partition P a family of collections in N .
Intuitively we interpret D as follows. For a partition P the family D(P ) consists
of all the collections C := {C1, . . . , Cl} whose players can leave the partition P
by forming a new, separate, group of players ∪lj=1Cj divided according to the
collection C.
Let D be a defection function. A partition P of the grand coalition N is said
to be D-stable if
sw(C[P ]) ≥ sw(C) (1)
for all collections C ∈ D(P ).
If C is a partition, then, as already noted C[P ] = P , so the above inequality
reduces to the comparison of the social welfare of P and C:
sw(P ) ≥ sw(C). (2)
This definition has the following natural interpretation. A partition P is
D-stable if no group of players is interested in leaving P when the players who
wish to leave can only form collections allowed by the defection function D(P ).
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This is a consequence of the fact that the ‘departing’ players cannot improve
upon their social welfare in comparison with their P -modified social welfare.
In what follows we shall consider three natural types of defection functions
D. Each will yield a different notion of a D-stable partition.
3 Dc-stability
We begin with the defection function Dc, where for each partition P , Dc(P ) is
the family of all collections in N . So this defection function Dc allows any group
of players to leave P and create an arbitrary collection in N . So by definition a
partition P is Dc-stable if and only if (1) holds for every collection C in N .
The following result shows that the Dc-stability condition can be consider-
ably simplified.
Theorem 3.1 A partition P := {P1, . . . , Pk} of N is Dc-stable if and only if
the following two conditions are satisfied:
(i) for each i ∈ {1, . . . , k} and each pair of disjoint coalitions A and B such
that A ∪B ⊆ Pi
v(A ∪B) ≥ v(A) + v(B), (3)
(ii) for each P -incompatible coalition T ⊆ N
k∑
i=1
v(Pi ∩ T ) ≥ v(T ). (4)
Proof.
(⇒) Suppose that A ∪ B ⊆ Pi for some i and a pair A and B of disjoint
coalitions. By taking the collection C := {A,B} we get that (3) is an immediate
consequence of (1) since by assumption v(∅) = 0.
Now suppose that T ⊆ N is a P -incompatible coalition. Then by taking the
singleton collection C := {T } we get that (4) is an immediate consequence of
(1).
(⇐) First note that (3) implies that for each i ∈ {1, . . . , k} and for each collection
C := {C1, . . . , Cl} with l > 1 and ∪lj=1Cj ⊆ Pi
v(∪lj=1Cj) ≥
l∑
j=1
v(Cj). (5)
Let now C := {C1, . . . , Cl} be an arbitrary collection in N . Define Di := {T |
T ∈ C and T ⊆ Pi} for i ∈ {1, . . . , k}. So Di is the set of those elements of C
that are subsets of Pi.
Further, let E := C \ ∪ki=1D
i. So C \ E = ∪ki=1D
i and hence
k∑
i=1
∑
T∈Di
v(T ) =
∑
T∈C\E
v(T ).
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Finally, let Ei := {T ∩ Pi | T ∈ E} for i ∈ {1, . . . , k}. By definition for every
i ∈ {1, . . . , k} and T ∈ Di ∪Ei we have T ⊆ Pi. Hence by (5) for i ∈ {1, . . . , k}
v(∪T∈Di∪Ei T ) ≥
∑
T∈Di∪Ei
v(T ).
Moreover, for i ∈ {1, . . . , k} we have
Pi ∩ (∪
l
j=1Cj) = ∪T∈Di∪Ei T,
so
k∑
i=1
v(Pi ∩ (∪
l
j=1Cj)) ≥
k∑
i=1
∑
T∈Di∪Ei
v(T ).
Further, since ∪ki=1D
i = C \ E, using (4) we have the following chain of
(in)equalities:
k∑
i=1
∑
T∈Di∪Ei
v(T ) =
∑
T∈C\E
v(T ) +
k∑
i=1
∑
T∈Ei
v(T )
=
∑
T∈C\E
v(T ) +
k∑
i=1
∑
T∈E
v(Pi ∩ T ) ≥
∑
T∈C\E
v(T ) +
∑
T∈E
v(T ) =
l∑
j=1
v(Cj) .
So we have shown that conditions (3) and (4) imply (1). ✷
The following observation characterizes the games in which each partition is
Dc-stable.
Theorem 3.2 A game (v,N) is additive if and only if each partition is Dc-
stable.
Proof. (⇒) By Theorem 3.1.
(⇐) Take two disjoint coalitions A and B of N . First consider a partition of N
which includes A ∪ B as an element. By item (i) of Theorem 3.1 we then get
v(A ∪ B) ≥ v(A) + v(B). Next, consider a partition P of N which includes A
and B as elements. Then A ∪ B is P -incompatible so by item (ii) of Theorem
3.1 we get then v(A) + v(B) ≥ v(A ∪B). So (v,N) is additive. ✷
In turn, the following observation shows that only few partitions can be
Dc-stable.
Note 3.3 If P is a Dc-stable partition, then
sw(P ) = max
Q
sw(Q), (6)
where the maximum is taken over all partitions Q in N .
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Proof. For any partition C of N (1) reduces to (2). ✷
In fact, in general Dc-stable partitions do not need to exist.
Example 3.4 Consider the game (v,N) with N = {1, 2, 3} and v defined by:
v(S) :=


2 if |S| = 1
5 if |S| = 2
6 if |S| = 3
We now show that no partition of N is Dc-stable. By Note 3.3 it suffices
to check that no partition that maximizes the social welfare in the set of all
partitions is Dc-stable.
First note that the social welfare of a partition P is maximized when |P | = 2
—in that case sw(P ) = 7. Then P = {P1, P2} with |P1| = 2 and |P2| = 1.
Suppose now P is Dc-stable. We can assume that P1 = {1, 2} and P2 = {3}.
(The other subcases are symmetric since v is symmetric.) Now putting T :=
{2, 3} in condition (4) of Theorem 3.1 we get 2+2 ≥ 5, which is a contradiction.
✷
For specific types of games the Dc-stable partitions do exist, as the following
two direct corollaries to Theorem 3.1 and Note 3.3 show.
Corollary 3.5 The one element partition P = {N} is Dc-stable if and only if
the game (v,N) is superadditive. Moreover, when (v,N) is strictly superadditive,
then P is a unique Dc-stable partition.
Corollary 3.6 The partition P = {{1}, {2}, . . . , {n}} is Dc-stable if and only
if the inequality
∑
i∈T v({i}) ≥ v(T ) holds for all T ⊆ N . Moreover, when all
inequalities are strict, then P is a unique Dc-stable partition.
4 Dp-stability
We now consider a weaker version of stability for which stable partitions are
guaranteed to exist. To this end we consider the defection function Dp, where
for each partition P , Dp(P ) is the family of all partitions of N . So the defection
function Dp allows a group of players to leave P only as the group of all players.
They can form then an arbitrary partition of N .
We have the following simple result.
Theorem 4.1 A partition P is Dp-stable if and only if (6) holds, where the
maximum is taken over all partitions Q in N .
Proof. For any partition C of N (1) reduces to (2). ✷
So the Dp-stable partitions are exactly those that maximize the social welfare
in the set of all partitions. Consequently the set of Dp-stable partitions is non-
empty. However, in specific situations the notion of a Dp-stable partition may
be inadequate.
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As an example suppose there are k locations and we wish to associate ‘op-
timally’ each player with a location, where optimality means that the resulting
social welfare is maximized. It may easily happen that in the considered game
all Dp-stable partitions have more than k coalitions, so an optimal partition in
the above sense cannot be described as a Dp-stable partition. To cope with such
situations we modify this notion as follows.
Given k ∈ {1, . . . , n} let Dkp be the defection function such that for each
partition P , Dkp(P ) is the family of all partitions of size at most k. Then the
following result holds.
Theorem 4.2 For each k ∈ {1, . . . , n} there exists a partition P of size at most
k which is Dkp-stable.
Proof. Let P be any partition of size at most k and satisfying the equality
sw(P ) = max
Qk
sw(Qk),
where the maximum is taken over all partitions Qk of size at most k. Then P
is the desired partition. ✷
5 Dhp-stability
Finally, we focus on the defection function Dhp, where for each partition P ,
Dhp(P ) is the family of all P -homogeneous partitions in N . So the defection
function Dhp allows the players to leave the partition P only by means of (possi-
bly multiple) merges or splittings. The existence of a Dhp-stable partition is then
guaranteed by Theorem 4.1 since every Dp-stable partition is also Dhp-stable.
Moreover, the following obvious analogue of Theorem 4.1 holds.
Theorem 5.1 A partition P is Dhp-stable if and only if (6) holds, where the
maximum is taken over all P -homogeneous partitions Q in N .
Also, this notion of stability admits the following characterization.
Theorem 5.2 A partition P := {P1, . . . , Pk} of N is Dhp-stable if and only if
the following two conditions are satisfied:
(i) for each i ∈ {1, . . . , k} and for each partition {C1, . . . , Cl} of the coalition
Pi
v(Pi) ≥
l∑
j=1
v(Cj), (7)
(ii) for each T ⊆ {1, . . . , k}
∑
i∈T
v(Pi) ≥ v(∪i∈TPi). (8)
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Proof.
(⇒) Let C := {C1, . . . , Cl} be an arbitrary partition of some coalition Pi in P .
Hence ∪lj=1Cj = Pi and (7) is an immediate consequence of (1) applied to the
P -homogenous partition {C1, . . . , Cl, P1, . . . , Pi−1, Pi+1, . . . , Pn}.
Next, consider some T ⊆ N . Then by applying (1) to the partition C :=
{∪i∈TPi} ∪ {Pi | i 6∈ T } we get the inequality (8).
(⇐) Let P := {P1, . . . , Pk} be any partition of N for which conditions (i) and
(ii) hold, and let C := {C1, . . . , Cl} be an arbitrary collection in Dhp(P ). By
definition C is a P -homogeneous partition. Therefore the coalitions of P can
be divided into disjoint groups {G1, . . . , Gr} of collections as follows: Pi and Pj
belong to the same group if and only if Pi ∪ Pj ⊆ Cs for some s.
Let us define L = {t | |Gt| = 1} and M = {t | |Gt| > 1}. By the P -
homogeneity of partition C, for each t ∈ L there is a set, say Ht, such that
Pt = ∪j∈HtCj . Similarly, for each t ∈ M there is a coalition of C, say Cq(t),
such that Cq(t) = ∪Pi∈GtPi. Hence, using (7) and (8), we get the following chain
of (in)equalities:
k∑
i=1
v(Pi ∩ (∪
l
j=1Cj)) =
k∑
t=1
v(Pt) =
∑
t∈L
v(∪j∈HtCj) +
∑
t∈M
∑
Pi∈Gt
v(Pi)
≥
∑
t∈L
∑
j∈Ht
v(Cj)+
∑
t∈M
v(∪Pi∈GtPi) =
∑
t∈L
∑
j∈Ht
v(Cj)+
∑
t∈M
v(Cq(t)) =
l∑
j=1
v(Cj) .
So we have shown that conditions (7) and (8) imply (1). ✷
To summarize the relationship between the considered notions of stable par-
tition, given a defection function D denote by ST (D) the set of D-stable parti-
tions. We have then the following obvious inclusions:
ST (Dc) ⊆ ST (Dp) ⊆ ST (Dhp).
With the possible exception of ST (Dc) the considered sets of stable partitions
are always non-empty.
6 Finding stable partitions
Next we consider the problem of finding stable partitions studied in the previous
sections. To this end we introduce two rules that allow us to modify a partition
of N .
merge
{T1, . . . , Tk} ∪ P → {∪
k
j=1Tj} ∪ P,
where
∑k
j=1 v(Tj) < v(∪
k
j=1Tj),
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split
{∪kj=1Tj} ∪ P → {T1, . . . , Tk} ∪ P,
where {T1, . . . , Tk} is a collection such that v(∪kj=1Tj) <
∑k
j=1 v(Tj),
The following observation holds.
Note 6.1 Every iteration of the merge and split rules terminates.
Proof. This is an immediate consequence of the fact that each rule application
increases the social welfare. ✷
We now proceed with the characterizations of the introduced notions of
stable partitions using the above rules. The cases of Dc-stable partitions and
Dp-stable partitions are not so straightforward, so we begin with the notion of
Dhp-stability. The following result holds.
Theorem 6.2 A partition is Dhp-stable if and only if it is the outcome of iter-
ating the merge and split rules.
Proof. It is an immediate consequence of Theorem 5.2. ✷
So to find a Dhp-stable partition it suffices to iterate the merge and split rules
starting from any initial partition until one reaches a partition closed under the
applications of these rules.
In general the outcome of various iterations of the merge and split rules
does not need to be unique. Moreover, some of these outcomes do not have a
maximal social welfare.
Example 6.3 Consider the following game (v,N). Let N = {1, 2, 3, 4} and let
v be defined as follows:
v(S) :=


1 if S = {1, 2}
2 if S = {1, 3}
0 otherwise
Consider now the partition {{1}, {2}, {3}, {4}} of N . By the merge rule we
can transform it to {{1, 2}, {3}, {4}} or to {{1, 3}, {2}, {4}}. The social welfare
of these partitions is, respectively, 1 and 2. In each case we reached a partition
to which neither merge nor split rule can be applied. ✷
We now proceed with an analysis of Dc-stable partitions using the merge
and split rules. First note the following observation.
Note 6.4 Every Dc-stable partition is closed under the applications of the merge
and split rules.
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Proof. This is an immediate consequence of Note 3.3. ✷
Unfortunately it is not possible to characterize Dc-stable partitions using the
merge and split rules. First, not every partition closed under the applications
of the merge and split rules is Dc-stable. Indeed, take the game from Example
3.4 and consider a partition with the maximal social welfare. This partition is
closed under the applications of the merge and split rules but we saw already
that in this game no Dc-stable partition exists.
Second, there are games in which Dc-stable partitions exist, but some itera-
tions of the merge and split rules may miss them.
Example 6.5 Let N = {1, 2, 3, 4} and define v as follows:
v(S) :=
{
3 if S = {1, 2}
|S| otherwise
It is straightforward to show using Theorem 3.1 that {{1, 2}, {3, 4}} is a
Dc-stable partition. Its social welfare is 5. Now, the partition {{1, 3}, {2, 4}} is
closed under the applications of the merge and split rules. But its social welfare
is 4 so by Note 3.3 it is not Dc-stable. ✷
Note that in the above example {{1, 2}, {3, 4}} is also a unique Dp-stable
partition (since it is the only partition with the social welfare 5), so some iter-
ations of the merge and split rules may also miss the Dp-stable partitions.
Third, there are games in which all iterations of the merge and split rules
have a unique outcome (which happens to be the unique partition that maxi-
mizes the social welfare in the set of all partitions), yet no Dc-stable partition
exists.
Example 6.6 Consider the following game. Let N = {1, 2, 3, 4} and let v be
defined as follows:
v(S) :=


6 if S = {1, 2, 3, 4}
4 if S = {1, 2} or S = {3, 4}
3 if S = {1, 3}
|S| otherwise
Clearly neither merge nor split rule can be applied to the partition {{1, 2}, {3, 4}}.
We now show that {{1, 2}, {3, 4}} is a unique outcome of the iterations of the
merge and split rules. Take a partition {T1, . . . , Tk} different from {{1, 2}, {3, 4}}.
If for some i we have Ti = {1, 2}, then {T1, . . . , Tk} = {{1, 2}, {3}, {4}} and
consequently {{1, 2}, {3}, {4}}→ {{1, 2}, {3, 4}} by the merge rule. If for some
i we have Ti = {3, 4}, then the argument is symmetric. If for some i we have
Ti = {1, 3}, then for j 6= i we have v(Tj) = |Tj |. Consequently, by the merge
and split rule
{T1, . . . , Tk}→ {{1, 2, 3, 4}}→ {{1, 2}, {3, 4}}.
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If {T1, . . . , Tk} = {{1, 2, 3, 4}}, then by the split rule
{{1, 2, 3, 4}}→ {{1, 2}, {3, 4}}.
If no Ti equals {1, 2}, {3, 4}, {1, 3} or {1, 2, 3, 4}, then for all i we have v(Ti) =
|Ti| and consequently by the merge rule and by the split rule
{T1, . . . , Tk}→ {{1, 2, 3, 4}}→ {{1, 2}, {3, 4}}.
So in this game all iterations of the merge and split rules have a unique
outcome, P := {{1, 2}, {3, 4}}. By Note 6.4 P is the only possible Dc-stable
partition. However, for the P -incompatible set {1, 3} we have
v({1, 3}) > v({1}) + v({3}) = v({1, 3} ∩ {1, 2}) + v({1, 3} ∩ {3, 4}).
So by Theorem 3.1 P is not Dc-stable and consequently this game has no Dc-
stable partitions. ✷
A natural question then arises whether some other simple rules exist using
which we could characterize the Dc-stable and Dp-stable partitions.
This is very unlikely. To clarify the matters let us return to Example 6.5.
We noted there that the partition {{1, 3}, {2, 4}} (with social welfare 4) is not
Dc-stable but is closed the applications of the merge and split rules.
So to transform {{1, 3}, {2, 4}} to {{1, 2}, {3, 4}}, which is a unique Dc-stable
and Dp-stable partition (and with social welfare 5), we need more powerful rules.
As we limit ourselves to rules that lead to a strict increase of the social wel-
fare, the only solution is to transform {{1, 3}, {2, 4}} to {{1, 2}, {3, 4}} directly,
in one rule application. In particular, the following natural rule does not suffice:
transfer
{T1, T2} ∪ P → {T1 \ U, T2 ∪ U} ∪ P,
where U ⊂ T1 and v(T1) + v(T2) < v(T1 \ U) + v(T2 ∪ U).
What we need is a rule that leads to a ‘bidirectional transfer’, for example
exchange
{T1, T2} ∪ P → {T1 \ U1 ∪ U2, T2 \ U2 ∪ U1} ∪ P,
where U1 ⊂ T1, U2 ⊂ T2 and v(T1)+v(T2) < v(T1\U1∪U2)+v(T2\U2∪U1).
This rule suffices here. But it is easy to construct an example where this
rule does not suffice either. We just need to generalize appropriately Example
6.5.
Let N := {1, 2, . . ., 2n, where n > 1, and define v as follows:
v(S) :=
{
n+1 if S = {1, 3, . . ., 2n− 1}
|S| otherwise
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Using Theorems 3.1 and 4.1 it is straightforward to check that {{1, 3, . . ., 2n−
1}, {2, 4, . . ., 2n}} is the unique Dc-stable and unique Dp-stable partition. Its
social welfare is 2n+1. Now the partition {P1, . . ., Pn}, where Pi := {2i− 1, 2i}
for i ∈ {1, . . ., n} has the social welfare 2n. So to transform it to {{1, 3, . . ., 2n−
1}, {2, 4, . . ., 2n}} we need a rule that can achieve it in one application. Of
course such a rule exists: it suffices to group the odd numbers into one set and
the even numbers into another. But it should be clear that any generic way of
formulating this operation leads to a pretty complex rule.
Continuing this line it is easy to envisage a series of increasingly more com-
plex examples which suggest that in the end the only rule using which we can
characterize the Dp-stable partitions seems to be the one that allows us to trans-
form an arbitrary partition into another one when the social welfare increases.
This defeats our purpose of finding a characterization by means of simple rules.
The fact that the Dc-stable partitions do not need to exist makes the task of
characterizing them by means of simple rules even more unlikely.
7 Strictly stable partitions
As a way out of this dilemma we consider a more refined notion of a stable par-
tition. Take a partition P of N . First note that for a collection C that consists
of some coalitions of P , i.e., for C ⊆ P we have C[P ] = C and consequently (1)
then holds.
Given a defection function D we now say that a partition P of N is strictly
D-stable if
sw(C[P ]) > sw(C)
for all collections C ∈ D(P ) that are not subsets of P .
We now analyze strictly Dc-stable partitions. The following analogue of
Theorem 3.1 holds.
Theorem 7.1 A partition P := {P1, . . . , Pk} of N is strictly Dc-stable if and
only if the following two conditions are satisfied:
• for each i ∈ {1, . . . , k} and each pair of disjoint coalitions A and B such
that A ∪B ⊆ Pi
v(A ∪B) > v(A) + v(B), (9)
• for each P -incompatible coalition T ⊆ N
k∑
i=1
v(Pi ∩ T ) > v(T ). (10)
Note that (9) and (10) are simply the sharp counterparts of the inequalities
(3) and (4).
Proof. The proof is a direct modification of the proof of Theorem 3.1. ✷
Next, we establish the following lemma.
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Lemma 7.2 Suppose that a strictly Dc-stable partition P exists. Let P
′ be a
partition which is closed under the applications of the merge and split rules.
Then P ′ = P .
Proof. Suppose P = {P1, . . . , Pk} and P ′ = {T1, . . . , Tm}. Assume by con-
tradiction that {P1, . . . , Pk} 6= {T1, . . . , Tm}. Then ∃i0 ∈ {1, . . . , k} ∀j ∈
{1, . . . ,m} Pi0 6= Tj . Let Tj1 , . . . , Tjl be the minimum cover of Pi0 .
Case 1. Pi0 = ∪
l
h=1Tjh .
Then l > 1 and {Tj1 , . . . , Tjl} is a partition of Pi0 . But P is strictly Dc-
stable, so by Theorem 7.1 and (9)
∑l
h=1 v(Tjh) < v(∪
l
h=1Tjh). Consequently,
the merge rule can be applied to {T1, . . . , Tm}, which is a contradiction.
Case 2. Pi0 is a proper subset of ∪
l
h=1Tjh .
Then for some jh the set Pi0 ∩ Tjh is a proper non-empty subset of Tjh . So
Tjh is a P -incompatible set. But P is strictly Dc-stable, so by Theorem 7.1 and
(10) v(Tjh) <
∑k
i=1 v(Pi ∩ Tjh). Consequently, since Tjh = ∪
k
i=1(Pi ∩ Tjh), the
split rule can be applied to {T1, . . . , Tm} which is a contradiction. ✷
This allows us to draw the following conclusions.
Theorem 7.3 Suppose that P is a strictly Dc-stable partition. Then
(i) P is the outcome of every iteration of the merge and split rules.
(ii) P is a unique Dc-stable partition.
(iii) P is a unique Dp-stable partition.
(iv) P is a unique Dhp-stable partition.
Proof.
(i) By Note 6.1 every iteration of the merge and split rules terminates, so the
claim follows by Lemma 7.2.
(ii) Suppose that P ′ is a Dc-stable partition. By Note 6.4 P
′ is closed under
the applications of the merge and split rules, so by Lemma 7.2 P ′ = P .
(iii) By Theorem 4.1 a partition is Dp-stable if and only if it maximizes the
social welfare (in the set of all partitions). But each partition that maximizes
the social welfare is closed under the applications of the merge and split rules,
so the claim follows from (i).
(iv) By (i) and Theorem 6.2. ✷
Item (i) shows that if a strictly Dc-stable partition exists, then we can reach
it from any initial partition through an arbitrary iteration of the merge and
split rules.
Example 6.5 shows that the concepts of unique and strictly Dc-stable par-
titions do not coincide. Indeed, by Note 3.3 {{1, 2}, {3, 4}} is there a unique
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Dc-stable partition. However, Theorem 7.1 implies that {{1, 2}, {3, 4}} is not
strictly Dc-stable. This is in contrast to the case of Dp-stable partitions as the
following characterization result shows.
Theorem 7.4 A partition is strictly Dp-stable if and only if it is a unique Dp-
stable partition.
Proof.
(⇒) Let P be a strictly Dp-stable partition. By definition sw(C[P ]) > sw(C)
for all partitions C different from P , or equivalently sw(P ) > sw(P ′) for all
partitions P ′ different from P . Let P ′ be a Dp-stable partition. By Theorem
4.1 both P and P ′ maximize the social welfare in the set of all partitions. So
sw(P ) = sw(P ′) and consequently P and P ′ coincide.
(⇐) Suppose P is a unique Dp-stable partition. Let P ′ be a partition different
from P . By Theorem 4.1 and uniqueness of P sw(P ) > sw(P ′). So P is a
strictly Dp-stable partition. ✷
The full analogue of Theorem 7.3 does not hold. Indeed, consider the fol-
lowing modification of Example 6.5.
Example 7.5 Let N = {1, 2, 3} and define v as follows:
v(S) :=
{
3 if S = {1, 2}
|S| otherwise
By Theorems 4.1 and 7.4 {{1, 2}, {3}} is a strictly Dp-stable partition. Its
social welfare is 4. But the partition {{1, 3}, {2}} is closed under the applications
of the merge and split rules and hence, by Theorem 6.2, is Dhp-stable. So
{{1, 2}, {3}} is not the outcome of every iteration of the merge and split rules
and is not a unique Dhp-stable partition. ✷
In turn, Example 6.6 shows that the existence of a strictly Dp-stable partition
does not imply the existence of a Dc-stable partition.
Finally, the following result deals with the strictly Dhp-stable partitions.
Theorem 7.6
(i) A partition is strictly Dhp-stable if and only if it is a unique Dhp-stable
partition.
(ii) A partition is strictly Dhp-stable if and only if it is strictly Dp-stable.
Proof.
(i) The proof is the same as that of Theorem 7.4, relying on Theorem 5.1 instead
of Theorem 4.1.
(ii)
(⇒) Let P be a strictly Dhp-stable partition. Take an arbitrary partition P
′
different from P and let P ′′ be an arbitrary closure of P ′ under the applications
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of the merge and split rules. By Theorem 6.2 P ′′ is Dhp-stable, so by the choice
of P either P = P ′′ or sw(P ) > sw(P ′′).
If P = P ′′, then, by the choice of P ′, P ′ is different from P ′′, so sw(P ′′) >
sw(P ′) and consequently sw(P ) > sw(P ′). In turn, if sw(P ) > sw(P ′′), then,
since sw(P ′′) ≥ sw(P ′), we get sw(P ) > sw(P ′), as well.
(⇐) Directly by definition. ✷
8 Existence of stable partitions
We saw already that in general a Dc-stable partition does not need to exist, so
a strictly Dc-stable partition does not need to exist either.
Under what condition a strictly Dc-stable partition does exists? First note
that by definition if the game is (strictly) superadditive, then {N} is its (strictly)
Dc-stable partition. The following example introduces a natural class of non-
superadditive games in which a Dc-stable (respectively, a strictly Dc-stable)
partition exists.
Example 8.1 Consider a partition P := {P1, . . . , Pk} of N . Let (v,N) be
a game which is non-negative (that is, v(A) ≥ 0 for all coalitions A of N),
superadditive when limited to subsets of a coalition Pi (for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n})
and such that v(A) = 0 for all P -incompatible sets. It is straightforward to
check with the help of Theorem 3.1 that P is a (not necessarily unique —see
Theorem 3.2) Dc-stable partition.
But if we additionally stipulate that (v,N) is positive (that is, v(A) > 0
for all coalitions A of N) and strictly superadditive, in each case when limited
to subsets of a coalition Pi (for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}), then P becomes a strictly
Dc-stable partition, and hence a unique partition with this property.
To see specific examples of such games choose a partition {P1, . . . , Pk} of N
and fix m ≥ 1. Let
v(S) :=
{
|S|m if S ⊆ Pi for some i
0 otherwise
Then when m = 1 we get an example of a game in the first category and when
m > 1 we get an example of a game in the second category. ✷
Next, Theorems 4.1 and 7.4 provide a simple criterion for the existence of
a strictly Dp-stable partition: such a partition exists if and only if exactly one
partition maximizes the social welfare in the set of all partitions. By virtue of
Theorem 7.6 the same existence criterion applies to strictly Dhp-stable parti-
tions.
Finally, let us return to our initial Example 1.1. Assume that:
• within each city the transportation costs per store decrease as the number
of served stores increases (economy of scale),
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• the transportation costs per store are always lower if the served stores are
located in the same city,
• the stores aim at minimizing the transportation costs and that switching
transportation companies incurs no costs.
To formally analyze this example assume that there are n stores and that
{P1, . . ., Pk} is the partition of the stores per city. Denote by c(S) the total
transportation costs to the set of stores S and let
v(S) :=
∑
i∈S
c({i})− c(S),
i.e., v(S) is the cost saving for coalition S.
Then the first assumption states that the function c(S)/|S|, when limited to
the sets of stores within one city, strictly decreases as the size of the set of stores
S increases. This easily implies that the game (v,N) is strictly superadditive
when limited to the set of stores within one city (see [9, pages 93-95]).1
In turn, the second assumption states that for each P -incompatible coali-
tion T ⊆ N (representing a set of stores from different cities) we have for
i ∈ {1, . . ., k}
c(Pi ∩ T )/|Pi ∩ T | < c(T )/|T |,
or equivalently c(Pi∩T ) < c(T )·|Pi∩T |/|T |. This implies
∑k
i=1 c(Pi∩T ) < c(T ),
so
∑k
i=1 v(Pi ∩ T ) > v(T ) by the definition of v.
So using Theorem 7.1 we get that the partition {P1, . . ., Pk} of the stores per
city is strictly Dc-stable. Using Theorem 7.3(i) we now conclude that the initial
transportation arrangement, per chain, can be broken and will lead through
an arbitrary sequence of splits and merges to the alternative transportation
arrangement, per city.
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